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“Knowledge . . . is made for cutting” (Foucault 1998, 380). With this 
proclamation, Michel Foucault calls us to a “slanted perception” (382) whose 
“deliberate” aim is to “appraise, to say yes or no, to follow all of poison’s traces, 
and to find the best antidote” for it (382, trans. modified). A cutting knowledge 
cuts to the chase, cuts the crap, occasionally cuts up with laughter. In that 
cutting spirit—touché!—we are pleased to introduce here a new regular feature 
of philoSOPHIA: “Short Cuts.” As the title implies, this section of the journal 
provides a forum for brief, incisive, explicitly slanted commentaries that cut: 
reflections, ruminations, rants, appraisals, and agitations on theoretical issues 
that speak directly to contemporary concerns. We hope these “Short Cuts” will 
agitate you, our readers: arouse your interest and, as the Latin agitare suggests, 
set things in motion for other exchanges and short cuts. We encourage you to 
write your own “Short Cuts” (maximum three thousand words) for consider-
ation in future issues of the journal.
—The Editors
short cuts

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Beyond Accommodation: Disability, 
Feminist Philosophy, and the Design 
of Everyday Academic Life
Aimi Hamraie
Disability has become a hot topic for feminist philosophy in recent years. 
Special issues of Hypatia and Disability Studies Quarterly, multiple confer-
ence keynote addresses, and a growing cadre of scholars are exploring the 
intersections of feminist and critical disability thought. As a disabled feminist 
scholar, I perceive these trends as a signal that the field of feminist philosophy 
is taking up disability concepts and theories in valuable ways. There is certainly 
much that feminist philosophers can learn from disabled scholars and critical 
disability scholarship and activism. Unlike dominant medical models of 
disability, which treat disabled minds and bodies as objects of knowledge 
for science and biomedicine, critical disability theories foreground disabled 
peoples’ knowledge and lived experiences. Often in conversation with feminist 
theories, they define disability as a valuable form of human variation, cultural 
diversity, situated knowledge, and a basis for relational ethics that should be 
preserved, and even desired (Mitchell and Snyder 2006; Kafer 2013; Garland-
Thomson 2011).
Like the feminist imperative to consider the personal as political, a central 
feature of critical disability scholarship and activism is the integration of our 
scholarly principles into material practices of access-making, whether in the 
classroom, at conferences, in web space, or in our writing. To do justice to 
disabled people’s existence, knowledge, and politics, feminist philosophers 
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should avoid making disability a mere theoretical resource for their work. 
Simply developing feminist philosophy with reference to disability is not 
meaningful or accountable unless feminist philosophers transform the 
material and cultural arrangements, real-time interactions, and physical 
spaces in which feminist philosophy takes place. To work toward meaningful 
access, feminist philosophers could follow Shelley Tremain’s statistical and 
interview-based documentation of structural inequalities that disabled 
philosophers experience, and Laura Davy’s suggestion that philosophers 
“redesign” the questions they ask about disability (Tremain 2013 ; Tremain, 
2016 ; Davy 2014). To build upon this work, I argue that feminist philoso-
phers must understand their labor as the design of everyday academic spaces 
and interactions, and accordingly become more accountable for material 
practices of accessibility.
Access, Academic Space, and Material Labor
As numerous sources have documented, the lack of meaningful access is 
particularly severe within the real-time interactions and physical spaces in 
which academic conferences, including feminist philosophy conferences, take 
place (Tremain 2013; Perry 2015; Bain 2016b). Disabled philosophers attending 
or presenting at conferences where disability is a focus of inquiry have found 
themselves excluded by seemingly neutral and normal physical aspects of the 
built environment, as well as norms of academic presentation. For instance, the 
presumption of conference presenters and audiences with normative cognitive, 
sensory, and physical characteristics governs the norms of oral speech, visual 
aides such as slides, the presentation of logical arguments, the assertion of 
expertise, and the analysis of texts—particularly when scholars practice these 
norms without providing multiple means of accessing their content. The norm 
that scholars are nondisabled and not chronically ill (and frequently also people 
with race, economic, and gender privilege) materializes in the ways that we 
hold conferences within particular types of spaces: conference centers, hotels, 
and university lecture halls with forward-facing chairs and inaccessible stages, 
lecterns with microphones, fluorescent lights, scented products, long hallways, 
narrow doorways, confusing layouts, and ramps that only appear at back doors 
near freight elevators.
Because communities are often defined by shared spaces, these norms also 
render less apparent those of us for whom these material features of the built 
environment determine the extent of our participation. For some participants, 
inaccessible conference spaces and classrooms may preclude their presence in 
a room. For others (particularly those whose disabilities are not apparent to 
others), the exhausting labors of passing may make some semblance of presence 
possible, but with significant hidden costs to the participant.
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Because privilege, as Sara Ahmed writes, is “an energy-saving device” 
(Ahmed 2013), the emotional and physical labors of creating access, like 
many forms of devalued labor, often go unnoticed. When features of built 
environments remain unmarked in conference accessibility statements and 
other practices, the labor of seeking out and creating access often falls upon 
disabled people (Bain 2016a; Price 2009). For instance, the lights, carpeting, 
air quality, overhead projectors, fragranced soaps, and mechanical noises so 
prevalent in classrooms and conference spaces, while often unnoticeable to 
others, require me to invest significant labor to learn about the space ahead 
of time, pack items that will help decrease exposure, manage overstimulation 
while listening to a formal presentation, give my own presentation through 
brain fog and exhaustion, and take time to recover afterward (often for days or 
weeks). To gain access to academic conferences, I am often asked to perform 
the labor of creating access for myself, whether by lending knowledge, sharing 
resources, or devising solutions. These significant investments of time and 
energy on my part are not counted as part of valuable academic labor. My fellow 
conference attendees do not perceive these labors because my body and ways 
of moving through the world do not appear to mark the presence of disability 
in a recognizable way.
Feminist Philosophers as Designers
Valuable academic labor often appears immaterial and disembodied: feminist 
philosophers hold one another accountable for what we say and think, but 
infrequently for what we make and materialize. For all of our training, we do 
not often understand ourselves as agents with the skills, power, or responsi-
bility to alter existing material arrangements—even arrangements such as the 
classrooms, conferences, and journals that we frequently create in order to 
propagate our scholarship. In academic settings, we create barriers and accom-
modations for one another, whether in the ways that we design our classroom 
layouts, write assignments, deliver presentations, organize slides and visual 
aides, or interrupt epistemic violence. If feminist philosophers are to address 
disability in any meaningful way, I argue that they must understand themselves 
as designers and makers who are accountable for the material arrangements 
and practices upon which their scholarship depends. In the case of disability, 
feminist philosophers must understand themselves as responsible for designing 
a more meaningfully accessible and inclusive scholarly community, and not 
simply for being rigorous thinkers and knowers.
While it may strike some as odd to expect feminist philosophers trained 
in rhetoric, discourse analysis, logic, argumentation, and the history of 
ideas to consider their labor as design, my argument is entirely consistent 
with decades of feminist scholarship concerning the social construction 
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of knowledge, the epistemic and conceptual work of material structures, 
and the imperative for more accountable research. Even when feminist 
theories turn away from the materiality of sex and gender, a commitment 
to ethical and material practices (when it comes to certain feminist goals) 
remains a hallmark of feminist methodologies. Admittedly, feminists have 
had to f ight for recognition as technological makers and architectural 
designers (Lange 2014). Undeniably, though, feminist pedagogies, method-
ologies, and epistemologies redesign the material arrangements of knowledge 
production.
Karen Barad’s useful notion of “onto-epistemology” suggests that by 
studying the entanglement of concepts and material arrangements, we can 
understand “how differences get made, what gets excluded, and how those 
exclusions matter” (Barad 2007, 30). Likewise, a commitment to practicing 
meaningful access offers feminist philosophers a bridge between feminist 
research questions and strategies to address structural inequalities.1 Designing 
meaningful access requires better engagements with the types of ontological, 
epistemological, and ethical questions with which feminist philosophers have 
been concerned for decades: Whose “bodyminds” do our scholarly communities 
anticipate (Price 2014b), which bodyminds appear to disrupt or “misfit” the 
space when they seek inclusion (Garland-Thomson 2011), and who becomes 
accountable for access denied?
But while the material practice of accessibility should be considered a core 
feminist project, the process of designing access requires additional concep-
tual and methodological tools. Historians and sociologists of knowledge 
offer the tools of exploring academic disciplines as “epistemic communities” 
and “epistemic cultures,” which are constellations of habits of thought and 
action, material arrangements of space and technology, relational trans-
actions, and other onto-epistemologies (Imrie 2012, 867 ; Hamraie 2012 ; 
Knorr-Cetina 1999). Similarly, the f ield of “design methodology” offers 
theories and research about what thinking and acting like a designer (that 
is, by embracing uncertainty and iteration as strategies for accountability) 
can do for contexts beyond architecture, particularly when the goal is social 
change (Cross 2011). Design methodology reveals that design processes are 
iterative and recursive, doubling back on themselves to integrate new ways 
of knowing and making.
Together, critical disability theories, design methodology, and sociologies 
of knowledge support the notion that access is a relational and epistemic 
practice. By approaching feminist philosophy as an epistemic community 
and access as a relational phenomenon, we can understand the f ield’s repre-
sentative practices toward disability and also draw upon existing work in 
disability theory to produce more accessible iterations of feminist epistemic 
community.
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Thinking with Disability
Feminist architectural theorists argue that design processes are also “desiring 
practices,” which provide clues regarding what types of bodies and people we 
expect to be in the world (Ruedi and Wrigglesworth 1996). But in desiring the 
expansion of disability concepts into feminist philosophy, scholars must also be 
careful to avoid treating disability as a mere conceptual repository. When we 
draw upon theories and lived experiences of disability to propagate feminist 
theory without also committing to meaningful structural inclusion for disabled 
scholars, we are refusing to “think with” and understand disability as anything 
other than an object (Erevelles 2014). We are, in other words, committing a 
form of appropriation.
One way that nondisabled feminist philosophers can think with disabled 
people and disability theorists is by attending to the nuances of ongoing 
debates surrounding meaningful access, rather than presuming how access 
should take shape. Conventionally, accessibility standards are found in 
laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which grant 
disabled people the right to access public life. The ADA enforces this right 
by mandating particular types of access in public buildings, but requiring 
that disabled people request accommodations on an individual basis when 
access is denied or inadequate. Several disability theorists, drawing upon the 
architectural practice of Universal Design, have argued that this “accom-
modationist” strategy is problematic for several reasons (Bain 2016; Dolmage 
2006 ; Hamraie 2013 ; Price 2014a; Tremain 2013 ; Yargeau 2013). First, it 
fails to understand accessibility as a collective or societal imperative for 
which nondisabled people are responsible. Instead, it forces disabled people 
to carry out the labor of requesting and creating access—often constantly. 
Second, accommodationist strategies single out disabled people as excep-
tional “misf its” in need of accommodation while keeping the structures 
that produce disability exclusion intact (Garland-Thomson 2011). Third, 
accommodationist strategies are often premised upon “retrof itting” a mate-
rial arrangement after the fact, rather than building a commitment to access 
into the process of designing a conference, event, or classroom. Too often, 
accessibility standards and expectations presume disabled peoples’ needs. 
Compliance-based checklists often fail to consider access as a qualita-
tive experience or framework. Achieving meaningful, rather than merely 
accommodationist, access requires (as Anita Silvers describes it) “profoundly 
transforming some dimensions of the core conventions that regulate our 
interpersonal transactions” (Silvers 1998, 23). Likewise, disability justice 
activists such as Mia Mingus argue that meaning ful access is an open-ended 
and long-term commitment to “challeng[ing] the ableist culture of our 
work,” rather than only focusing on logistics (Mingus 2010).
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But the critique of accommodationism should not imply that flexibility 
toward individual access needs is unnecessary. The broad anticipation of acces-
sibility needs that is frequently portrayed as the converse of accommodationism 
is not immune to the disadvantages associated with this approach. When acces-
sibility becomes a matter of thinking for disabled people by presuming access 
needs and building them into rigid structures, it becomes another standardized, 
one-size-fits-all practice that excludes those who are unanticipated or illegible. 
Instead, meaningful access requires building in mechanisms for accountability 
that hold space for critical questions about material arrangements—the kind 
of spaces offered by iterative design processes.
Tanya Titchkosky, a disabled feminist sociologist, describes access as a 
process of enactments that occur within an “interpretive relation between 
bodies (Titchkosky 2011, 3). She explains,
Access is a way to orient to, and even come to wonder about, who, what, 
where, and when we find ourselves to be in social space. Through the percep-
tual consciousness of “access,” people take social life into account as a space of 
questions regarding who belongs where, under what auspices or qualifications, 
and during what times or through what particular thresholds. Access, then, 
is tied to the social organization of participation, even to belonging. Access 
not only needs to be sought out and fought for, legally secured, physically 
measured, and politically protected, it also needs to be understood—as a 
complex form of perception that organizes socio-political relations between 
people in social space. (Titchkosky 2011, 3–4, emphasis added)
Meaningful access, then, is relational accountability. It materializes from a 
commitment to enact, iterate, and re-iterate our answer to the questions of who 
belongs, where, and how. Design methodology offers that both accommodation 
and anticipatory forms of access are necessary aspects of the iterative design 
process. Indeed, for access to be an ongoing commitment to social and material 
transformation requires holding space for redesigning our strategies for access, 
in addition to committing to the ideal of more accessible academic spaces.
A classic example of meaningful access is the structure of the curb cut, 
which offers wheelchair users, as well as cyclists, pedestrians, and people 
pushing strollers, a mechanism of transit from sidewalks to streets. The curb 
cut has become a metaphor for what I call “broad accessibility,” or the notion 
that disability access also benefits other marginalized users of built environ-
ments (Hamraie 2013). But far more instructive than the curb cut metaphor are 
the lessons offered by the design methodologies adopted to create the curb cuts 
that appear in cities today.
Before laws such as the ADA, many disabled people and their allies 
designed features of the built environment that could create accessibility, and 
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used these design processes to generate new disability theories. In Berkeley, 
California, disability communities and mutual aid networks initially formed 
around specific ways of navigating built environments, such as using a wheel-
chair or powerchair (in the case of people with mobility impairments) or white 
canes (in the case of blind and visually impaired people). A key step toward 
physical access for chair users came when activists demanded that the city 
install curb cuts, which are ramps that transition from the street to the side-
walk, along the commercial corridor of Telegraph Avenue (Williamson 2012). 
Once installed, nondisabled pedestrians, cyclists, and people pushing strollers 
also found curb cuts useful, which led some activists to claim that accessible 
design benefits everyone (an idea that is now called “Universal Design”). Yet 
blind and visually impaired people contested this idea. Because many blind 
people memorize paths of travel, the new curb cuts were challenging and even 
dangerous: without the lip of the sidewalk, it was impossible to know when to 
check for traffic before crossing the street. Access for some did not by default 
ensure access for others.
If disability activists had thought purely in conceptual or accommoda-
tionist terms, they may have understood the curb cut as an inevitable point of 
tension—a failure to anticipate all users—and may have abandoned their goals 
altogether. Instead, they thought like designers. They created new iterations of 
the curb cut, placed them in different locations, experimented with various 
slopes and grades, and created bumpy tactile surfaces to provide blind people 
with information about the elevation change while also giving chair users 
access to the street. The curb cuts that we find most often today on street 
corners with raised yellow bumps reflect these early experiments.
Feminist scholarship is to the discipline of philosophy what those initial, 
partially accessible curb cuts were to the Berkeley urban environment. As 
feminist political theorist Brooke Ackerly has argued, feminist frameworks 
can embody the curb cut by benef itting multiple constituencies beyond 
women (Ackerly 2008, 141). But if feminist philosophy is to create meaningful 
disability access, scholars will need to acknowledge the limitations of their 
own knowledge about disability and be open to re-iterating their epistemic 
community’s material norms.
That access is a relational phenomenon suggests that it can also be learned 
through interaction and materialized through reciprocal encounters. For 
example, I attended my f irst philoSOPHIA meeting in 2015 with colleagues 
in feminist disability studies. Because some of us identify as disabled and 
participate in conferences such as the Society for Disability Studies meeting, 
where accessible presentations are a requirement, we planned our access 
strategy ahead of time. The strategies were simple: because we planned to 
read text and show slides with images, we built time into our talks for verbal 
descriptions of the images; we brought handouts and large-print copies 
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of our papers to share with the audience; we planned to speak at an easy, 
conversational pace. We also planned to be f lexible and change our plans 
as needed once we knew more about the room, the audience, and our own 
needs in the space. In the room, we turned off the f luorescent lights, adapted 
our speaking style to the circular arrangement of chairs by presenting from 
the corner (where our faces and lips were more visible to the audience), and 
described our images rather than displaying them on the projector. These 
practices afforded the presenters and audience members alike multi-modal 
ways of accessing information.
Though many members of our audience were not accustomed to these 
practices and may not have considered themselves to need or benefit from 
them, they reciprocated our efforts with thoughtful and curious engagement. 
It was clear that the members of the philoSOPHIA community wanted to know 
more about how to be accountable toward disability and that they were open 
to receiving ideas and resources about where to begin. This reciprocity was 
illustrative of more collective models of access, which center disability experi-
ences and also hold nondisabled people accountable for facilitating inclusion 
(Hamraie 2013; Mingus 2010).
Designing Accessible Feminist Futures
From what I understand, efforts to redesign philoSOPHIA ’s accessibility in 
future meetings are under way. Like research, design processes begin with 
questions. If you were designing the next philoSOPHIA conference to be as 
inclusive as possible, where would you begin? Who would you turn to for 
knowledge and expertise? Who would perform the labor? What resources 
would you allocate toward inclusion? What elements of a typical conference 
experience would you redesign? How would you know when meaningful 
access has been achieved? What protocols will you put in place to maintain 
accountability?
In the spirit of recent moves to redesign the professional norms and practices 
of feminist philosophy, I offer the rest of this piece as a series of provocations 
and tools for creating meaningful access:
1. Access is a beginning, not an end point. Returning to Titchkosky’s notion
of access as an “interpretive relation between bodies,” accountability toward
disability access means committing to cycles of success, failure, and (re)
iteration. Put another way, access is a long-term commitment to do better.
2. Meaningful access requires us to ask not only, “Who belongs?” but also,
“How do we know?” Whose knowledge and leadership is foregrounded?
Whose labors are employed in creating access and how are these labors
compensated?
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3. When we begin to think about accessibility, the task can appear daunting.
There may appear to be too many variables to consider in addition to the
planning of a conference. The unpredictability of access should not, however,
be used to discredit the need for it in conference spaces. Whether one is an
organizer, a speaker, or an audience member, the plentiful opportunities for
redesigning the material arrangement of space should be considered as part
of the feminist project of creating more inclusive spaces for scholarly inquiry.
4. Fortunately, several generations of disability scholars, activists, and makers
have asked these exact questions and experimented with new forms of
access. Feminist philosophers, particularly nondisabled feminist philoso-
phers who are beginning to draw upon disability theories, would do well
to also learn from earlier access experiments, such as the ones described
above.
5. While accommodationist approaches try to contain the disruption that
disability represents to a normative order, laws such as the ADA also offer
feminist philosophers an important reminder about ethics and accountability:
Those who make the world have a responsibility toward those who dwell within it.
6. Meaningful access requires collective labor. Disabled philosophers and
attendees should thus have opportunities to set the agenda for access but all
conference attendees and organizers must be willing to perform the labor
of creating it. While accessibility guidelines, accommodation requests, and
committees are an important beginning, they do not create meaningful
access if their labor falls disproportionately upon disabled people.
7. The iterative work of meaningful accessibility does not have to be stifling
or daunting if we begin our new iterations of feminist philosophy with
questions of who belongs, how we can know, and how to include the
expertise of those most affected by the lack of access while shifting labor
to those with more privilege.
8. The goal of meaningful access should be to create channels for account-
ability and re-iteration, rather than to decide for others what counts as
access. In addition to providing as much access as possible as a default
practice, setting procedures in place for addressing denials of access or
the need to make alterations to existing material arrangements should
be understood as part of the broader feminist project of redesigning
philosophy to expand diversity.
Note
1. As a caveat, though I focus on disability, my argument has potential implica-
tions for the project of broadening philosophical practices beyond the norms set
by white, non-disabled, heterosexual, cisgender (and often male) philosophers
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(a project that Parker describes in an earlier Short Cut). Racial and economic 
justice, for instance, are ongoing projects of creating through thoughtful iterations.
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